Full Report in Text of the CBO report and Debt Levels

July 28, 2010

ECONOMIC AND BUDGET ISSUE BRIEF

CBO

A series of issue summaries from

the Congressional Budget Office

JULY 27, 2010

Federal Debt and the Risk of a Fiscal Crisis

Over the past few years, U.S. government debt held by imposing higher marginal tax rates, those rates would dis-

the public has grown rapidly—to the point that, com- courage work and saving and further reduce output. Ris-

ing interest costs might also force reductions in spending

pared with the total output of the economy, it is now

on important government programs. Moreover, rising

higher than it has ever been except during the period

debt would increasingly restrict the ability of policy-

around World War II. The recent increase in debt has

makers to use fiscal policy to respond to unexpected

been the result of three sets of factors: an imbalance

challenges, such as economic downturns or international

between federal revenues and spending that predates the

crises.

recession and the recent turmoil in financial markets,

sharply lower revenues and elevated spending that derive

Beyond those gradual consequences, a growing level of

directly from those economic conditions, and the costs of

federal debt would also increase the probability of a sud-

various federal policies implemented in response to the

den fiscal crisis, during which investors would lose confi-

conditions.1

dence in the government’s ability to manage its budget,

and the government would thereby lose its ability to bor-

Further increases in federal debt relative to the nation’s

row at affordable rates. It is possible that interest rates

output (gross domestic product, or GDP) almost cer-

would rise gradually as investors’ confidence declined,

tainly lie ahead if current policies remain in place. The

giving legislators advance warning of the worsening situa-

aging of the population and rising costs for health care

tion and sufficient time to make policy choices that could

will push federal spending, measured as a percentage of

avert a crisis. But as other countries’ experiences show, it

GDP, well above the levels experienced in recent decades.

is also possible that investors would lose confidence

Unless policymakers restrain the growth of spending,

abruptly and interest rates on government debt would

increase revenues significantly as a share of GDP, or adopt

rise sharply. The exact point at which such a crisis might

some combination of those two approaches, growing

occur for the United States is unknown, in part because

budget deficits will cause debt to rise to unsupportable

the ratio of federal debt to GDP is climbing into unfamil-

levels.

iar territory and in part because the risk of a crisis is influ-

enced by a number of other factors, including the govern-

Although deficits during or shortly after a recession gen-

ment’s long-term budget outlook, its near-term

erally hasten economic recovery, persistent deficits and

borrowing needs, and the health of the economy. When

continually mounting debt would have several negative

fiscal crises do occur, they often happen during an eco-

economic consequences for the United States. Some of

nomic downturn, which amplifies the difficulties of

those consequences would arise gradually: A growing por-

adjusting fiscal policy in response.

tion of people’s savings would go to purchase government

debt rather than toward investments in productive capital

If the United States encountered a fiscal crisis, the abrupt

goods such as factories and computers; that “crowding

rise in interest rates would reflect investors’ fears that the

out” of investment would lead to lower output and

government would renege on the terms of its existing

incomes than would otherwise occur. In addition, if the

debt or that it would increase the supply of money to

payment of interest on the extra debt was financed by

finance its activities or pay creditors and thereby boost

inflation. To restore investors’ confidence, policymakers

1. For more details, see Congressional Budget Office, The Budget

would probably need to enact spending cuts or tax

and Economic Outlook: Fiscal Years 2010 to 2020 (January 2010);

increases more drastic and painful than those that would

The Effects of Automatic Stabilizers on the Federal Budget (May

have been necessary had the adjustments come sooner.

2010).

ECONOMIC AND BUDGET ISSUE BRIEF

CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE

2

Figure 1.

Federal Debt Held by the Public, 1790 to 2035

(Percentage of gross domestic product)

200

Actual Projected

CBO’s

World War II

150

Alternative

Fiscal

Scenario

The Great

100

Depression

World War I CBO’s

50

Extended-

Baseline

Scenario

0

1790 1810 1830 1850 1870 1890 1910 1930 1950 1970 1990 2010 2030

Source: Congressional Budget Office, The Long-Term Budget Outlook (June 2010); Historical Data on Federal Debt Held by the Public

(July 2010).

Note: The extended-baseline scenario adheres closely to current law, following CBO’s 10-year baseline budget projections through 2020

(with adjustments for the recently enacted health care legislation) and then extending the baseline concept for the rest of the long-

term projection period. The alternative fiscal scenario incorporates several changes to current law that are widely expected to occur or

that would modify some provisions that might be difficult to sustain for a long period.

Past and Projected Federal Debt far, roughly 25 percent of GDP—can be attributed in

part to an ongoing imbalance between federal revenues

Held by the Public and spending but, more important, to the financial

Compared with the size of the economy, federal debt held

crisis and deep recession and the policy responses to those

by the public is high by historical standards but is not

developments. According to the Congressional Budget

without precedent (see Figure 1).2 Previous sharp run-ups

Office’s (CBO’s) projections, federal debt held by the

have generally occurred during wars: During the Civil public will stand at 62 percent of GDP at the end of fiscal

War and World War I, debt climbed by about 30 percent year 2010, having risen from 36 percent at the end of fis-

of GDP; in World War II, debt surged by nearly 80 per- cal year 2007, just before the recession began. In only one

cent of GDP. In contrast, the recent jump in debt—so other period in U.S. history—during and shortly after

World War II—has that figure exceeded 50 percent.

2. The size of a country’s economy provides a measure of its ability to

pay interest on government debt, in the same way that a family’s Looking forward, CBO has projected long-term budget

income helps to determine the amount of mortgage interest that it outcomes under two different sets of assumptions about

can afford. Federal debt has two main components: debt held by

future policies for revenues and spending.3 The extended-

the public, and debt held by government trust funds and other

baseline scenario adheres closely to current law, following

government accounts. This issue brief focuses on the former as the

CBO’s 10-year baseline budget projections through 2020

most meaningful measure for assessing the relationship between

federal debt and the economy. Debt held by the public represents (with adjustments for the recently enacted health care leg-

the amount that the government has borrowed in financial

islation) and then roughly extending the baseline concept

markets to pay for its operations and activities; in pursuing such

borrowing, the government competes with other participants in

credit markets for financial resources. In contrast, debt held by 3. For details about the assumptions underlying the scenarios, see

government trust funds and other government accounts represents Congressional Budget Office, The Long-Term Budget Outlook

internal transactions of the government. (June 2010), Table 1-1.

ECONOMIC AND BUDGET ISSUE BRIEF

FEDERAL DEBT AND THE RISK OF A FISCAL CRISIS 3

for subsequent decades. Under that scenario, annual economic recovery. In particular, when many workers

budget deficits would decline over the next few years, and are unemployed, and much capacity (such as equipment

both deficits and debt would remain stable relative to and buildings) is unused, higher government spending and

GDP for several years after that. But then growth in lower tax revenues usually increase overall demand for

spending on health care programs and Social Security goods and services, which leads firms to boost their output

would cause deficits to increase, and debt would once and hire more workers.4 But those short-term benefits

again grow faster than the economy. By 2035, the debt carry with them long-term costs: Unless offsetting actions

would equal about 80 percent of GDP. are taken at some point to pay off the additional govern-

ment debt accumulated while the economy was weak,

However, certain changes to current law are widely people’s future incomes will tend to be lower than they

expected to be made in some form over the next few otherwise would have been.

years, and other provisions of current law might be diffi-

cult to sustain for a long period. Therefore, CBO also More generally, persistent, large deficits that are not

developed an alternative fiscal scenario, in which most of related to economic slowdowns—like the deficits that

the tax cuts originally enacted in 2001 and 2003 are CBO projects for coming decades—have a number of

extended (rather than allowed to expire at the end of this significant negative consequences. Therefore, the sooner

year as scheduled under current law); the alternative min- that policymakers agree on credible long-term changes to

imum tax is indexed for inflation (halting its growing government spending and revenues, and the sooner that

reach under current law); Medicare’s payments to physi- those changes are carried out without impeding the eco-

cians rise over time (which would not happen under cur- nomic recovery, the smaller will be the damage to the

rent law); tax law evolves in the long run so that tax reve- economy from growing federal debt.

nues remain at about 19 percent of GDP; and some other

aspects of current law are adjusted in coming years. Crowding Out of Investment

One impact of rising debt is that increased government

Under that scenario, deficits would also decline for a few borrowing tends to crowd out private investment in pro-

years after 2010 and then grow again, but that growth ductive capital, because the portion of people’s savings

would occur sooner and at a much faster rate than under

used to buy government securities is not available to fund

the extended-baseline scenario. By 2020, debt would

such investment. The result is a smaller capital stock and

equal nearly 90 percent of GDP. After that, the growing

lower output and incomes in the long run than would

imbalance between revenues and noninterest spending,

otherwise be the case.

combined with the spiraling cost of interest payments,

would swiftly push federal debt to unsustainable levels. The effect of debt on investment can be offset by bor-

Debt held by the public would exceed its historical peak rowing from foreign individuals or institutions. But addi-

of about 110 percent of GDP by 2025 and would reach

tional inflows of foreign capital also create the obligation

about 180 percent of GDP in 2035. Indeed, if those esti-

for more profits and interest to flow overseas in the

mates took into account the harmful effects that rising

future. Thus, although flows of capital into a country

debt would have on economic growth and interest rates,

can help maintain domestic investment, most of the gains

the projected increase in debt would occur even more

from that additional investment do not accrue to the

rapidly. Under the alternative fiscal scenario, the surge in

residents.

debt relative to the country’s output would pose a clear

threat of a fiscal crisis during the next two decades.

Need for Higher Taxes or Less Spending on

Government Programs

Some Consequences of Growing Debt Another impact of rising debt is that, as government debt

grows, so does the amount of interest the government

The economic effects of budget deficits and accumulating

pays to its lenders (all else being equal). If policymakers

government debt can differ in the short run and the

wished to maintain government benefits and services

long run, depending importantly on the prevailing eco-

nomic conditions when the deficits are incurred. During

and shortly after a recession, the higher spending or lower 4. See Congressional Budget Office, Policies for Increasing Economic

taxes that generate larger deficits generally hasten Growth and Employment in 2010 and 2011 (January 2010).

ECONOMIC AND BUDGET ISSUE BRIEF

CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE

4

while the amount of interest paid grew, tax revenues flexibility and increased dependence on foreign investors

would eventually have to rise as well. To the extent that that would accompany a rising debt could weaken the

additional tax revenues were generated by increasing mar- United States’ international leadership.

ginal tax rates, those rates would discourage work and

saving, further reducing output and incomes. Alterna-

An Increased Chance of a Fiscal Crisis

tively, policymakers could choose to offset the rising

A rising level of government debt would have another

interest costs, at least in part, by reductions in benefits

significant negative consequence. Combined with an

and services.

unfavorable long-term budget outlook, it would increase

the probability of a fiscal crisis for the United States. In

To be sure, slowing the growth of government debt to

such a crisis, investors become unwilling to finance all of

hold down future interest payments would require

a government’s borrowing needs unless they are compen-

increases in taxes or reductions in government benefits

sated with very high interest rates; as a result, the interest

and services anyway. However, earlier action would per-

rates on government debt rise suddenly and sharply rela-

mit the changes in policy to be smaller and more gradual,

tive to rates of return on other assets. Unfortunately, there

and it would give people more time to adjust to the

is no way to predict with any confidence whether and

changes—although it would also require more sacrifices

when such a crisis might occur in the United States; in

by current generations to benefit future ones.

particular, there is no identifiable tipping point of debt

Reduced Ability to Respond to Domestic and relative to GDP indicating that a crisis is likely or immi-

International Problems nent. But all else being equal, the higher the debt, the

greater the risk of such a crisis.

Having a small amount of debt outstanding gives policy-

makers the ability to borrow to address significant

Fiscal crises around the world have often begun during

unexpected events such as recessions, financial crises,

recessions and, in turn, have often exacerbated them.6

and wars. A large amount of debt, however, leaves less

Frequently, such a crisis was triggered by news that a gov-

flexibility for government actions to address financial and

ernment would, for any number of reasons, need to bor-

economic crises, which, in many countries, have been

row an unexpectedly large amount of money. Then, as

very costly to the government (as well as to residents).5

investors lost confidence and interest rates spiked, bor-

A large amount of debt could also harm national security

rowing became more difficult and expensive for the gov-

by constraining military spending in times of crisis or

ernment. That development forced policymakers to

limiting the ability to prepare for a crisis.

immediately and substantially cut spending and increase

In the United States, the level of federal debt a few years taxes to reassure investors—or to renege on the terms of

ago gave the government the flexibility to boost spending its existing debt or increase the supply of money and

and cut taxes to stimulate economic activity, to provide boost inflation. In some cases, the crisis made borrowing

public funding to stabilize the financial sector, and to more expensive for private borrowers as well, because

continue paying for other programs, even as tax revenues uncertainty about the government’s policy response to the

dropped sharply because of the decline in output and crisis raised risk premiums throughout the economy.

incomes. If the amount of federal debt (relative to out- Higher private interest rates, combined with reductions

put) stays at its current level or increases further, the gov- in government spending and increases in taxes, have

ernment would find it more difficult to undertake similar tended to worsen economic conditions in the short term.

policies in the future. Moreover, the reduced financial

The history of fiscal crises in other countries does not

necessarily indicate the conditions under which investors

5. See Carmen M. Reinhart and Kenneth S. Rogoff, Banking Crises:

might lose confidence in the U.S. government’s ability

An Equal Opportunity Menace, Discussion Paper DP7131

(London: Centre for Economic Policy Research, January 2009). to manage its budget or the consequences for the nation

The authors estimate that debt in countries with banking crises

of such a loss of confidence. On the one hand, the

increases by an average of 86 percent in the three years after

those crises. See also Luc Laeven and Fabian Valencia, Systemic

Banking Crises: A New Database, Working Paper No. 08-224 6. See Eduardo Borensztein and Ugo Panizza, The Costs of Sovereign

(Washington, D.C.: International Monetary Fund, November Default, Working Paper No. 08-238 (Washington, D.C.:

2008). International Monetary Fund, October 2008).

ECONOMIC AND BUDGET ISSUE BRIEF

FEDERAL DEBT AND THE RISK OF A FISCAL CRISIS 5

United States may be able to issue more debt (relative to funds in international markets. Argentina’s fiscal crisis

output) than the governments of other countries can, accentuated its underlying economic problems, and from

without triggering a crisis, because the United States has 2001 to 2002, the country’s GDP dropped by nearly

often been viewed as a “safe haven” by investors around 11 percent.

the world, and the U.S. government’s securities have

often been viewed as being among the safest investments Ireland

in the world. On the other hand, the United States may In spite of a good credit history and a relatively small

not be able to issue as much debt as the governments of amount of government debt, Ireland experienced a fiscal

other countries can because the private saving rate has crisis after being overwhelmed by large spending obliga-

been lower in the United States than in most developed tions, including those related to the recent financial crisis.

countries, and a significant share of U.S. debt has been

As recently as 2007, Ireland carried a central government

sold to foreign investors. Quantifying those factors and

debt of only about 20 percent of output; interest rates on

the many other factors that could be relevant to how a

Irish bonds at the time suggested that investors consid-

fiscal crisis would unfold in the United States is beyond

ered those bonds to be almost as safe as German bonds,

the scope of this brief.

which are generally perceived as stable and reliable invest-

ments. Over the next two years, however, Ireland’s debt

Nonetheless, a review of fiscal crises in Argentina,

grew very rapidly as the country dealt with massive fail-

Ireland, and Greece in the past decade reveals instructive

ures of financial institutions and a major economic

common features and differences. For all three countries,

downturn. Investors began to lose confidence that Ireland

the crises occurred abruptly and during recessions. How-

ever, the crises occurred at different levels of government could manage its rapidly expanding obligations, and by

debt relative to GDP, showing that the tipping point for a March of last year, investors in 10-year Irish bonds

crisis does not depend solely on the debt-to-GDP ratio; demanded almost 3 percentage points in extra annual

the government’s long-term budget outlook, its near-term interest relative to the rate for German bonds of the same

borrowing needs, and the health of the economy are also maturity (see Figure 2).

important. All three of those crises illustrate the difficulty

of formulating effective policy responses once investors Starting in April 2009, Ireland responded with an aggres-

lose confidence in a government. sive fiscal austerity program in which it raised taxes and

reduced spending significantly. The program included

Argentina cutting wages for public-sector employees by 15 percent,

Argentina’s experience offers an example of the very seri-

levying additional taxes, and sharply trimming a number

ous consequences that can arise from a fiscal crisis.

of social programs. Investors initially responded with

Although interest rates on Argentina’s debt had been

renewed confidence, which was reflected in reduced

comparable for many years with those on debt of other

interest rates on Irish debt and lower rates for insurance

countries in emerging markets, Argentina’s fortunes

on Irish bonds (although those measures of perceived risk

changed quickly when it found itself suffering from a sig-

remained less favorable than they had been before the cri-

nificant recession in 2000 and 2001. During the first half

sis).8 However, the budget deficit in Ireland remains large

of 2001, with government debt equal to about 50 percent

of the country’s GDP, investors became increasingly wor-

ried about Argentina’s fiscal situation—in part because of 7. All interest rates cited in this issue brief are in nominal terms. The

data on Argentina are drawn from Donald Mathieson, Garry

the country’s earlier defaults on its debt. As a result, inves-

Schinasi, and others, International Capital Markets: Developments,

tors demanded premiums for holding government debt

Prospects, and Key Policy Issues (Washington, D.C.: International

that increased interest rates by more than 5 percentage Monetary Fund, 2001), p. 63. The data on Ireland and Greece are

points.7 A few months later, as it became clear that from Bloomberg.

Argentina was not able to afford (or willing to make) the

8. Investors can purchase insurance that pays off in the event that a

interest payments on its debt, interest rates jumped again government defaults on its debt. The cost of such insurance is one

to levels so high that the government was effectively indicator of a fiscal crisis; all else being equal, the higher the cost

unable to borrow. Subsequently, Argentina ceased paying of insurance, the higher the perceived probability of a government

its creditors, and ever since it has been unable to raise default.

ECONOMIC AND BUDGET ISSUE BRIEF

CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE

6

Figure 2.

Interest Rates on 10-Year Debt Issued by Greece and Ireland

(Percentage points above the rate for comparable German bonds)

10

9

8

7

6

5

Greece

4

3

2

Ireland

1

0

Jan. 1, Mar. 11, May 20, Jul. 29, Oct. 7, Dec. 16, Feb. 24, May 5, Jul. 14, Sep. 22, Dec. 1, Feb. 9, Apr. 20, Jun. 29,

2008 2008 2008 2008 2008 2008 2009 2009 2009 2009 2009 2010 2010 2010

Source: Bloomberg.

Note: German bonds, denominated in euros, are generally perceived as stable and reliable investments. The difference in interest rates

between German bonds and other countries’ euro-denominated bonds reflects investors’ relative level of confidence in the safety and

security of those other countries’ debts.

and the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and German bonds (see Figure 2). Investors’ confidence, as

measured by both interest rates on Greek government

Development (OECD) projected late last year that

debt and the cost of buying insurance against a default

Ireland’s debt would increase to approximately 70 percent

of GDP by the end of 2010.9 Some observers believe that on such debt, deteriorated throughout 2009. By January

2010, Greece was forced to pay an interest rate on

the austerity program may not be sufficient to put Ire-

10-year bonds that was 4 percentage points higher than

land’s debt on a sustainable path, and investors may share

Germany was paying.

that view, because interest rates on 10-year Irish bonds

have risen again to almost 3 percentage points above

Greece’s crisis continued to worsen as interest rates

those on comparable German bonds.10

climbed higher in the spring. In May 2010, a consortium

of European countries and the International Monetary

Greece

Fund pledged to lend to the Greek government up to

In 2008, before the recent global recession, the central

120 billion euros (an amount equal to just over 50 per-

government in Greece owed its creditors an amount equal

cent of Greece’s GDP last year). Greece also adopted a fis-

to approximately 110 percent of the country’s GDP, a

cal austerity program that includes significant reductions

ratio that rose further as the recession lowered output and

in benefits and public services as well as increases in taxes.

increased the deficit by weakening the country’s tax base.

The actions by the Greek government and other govern-

In early 2009, interest rates on 10-year Greek bonds

ments caused the crisis to abate temporarily. However, it

jumped by 2 percentage points over rates on comparable

is unclear whether investors will be convinced that spend-

ing will be cut or taxes increased sufficiently to put the

9. Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development,

country on a sustainable fiscal path. Moreover, the

OECD Economic Surveys: Ireland 2009, vol. 2009, no. 17

amount of maturing debt that the country needs to refi-

(Paris: OECD, November 2009).

nance in the next few years, in addition to the debt that it

10. For one observer’s point of view, see Barry Eichengreen, “Emerald

needs to sell to finance its ongoing deficit, has reinforced

Isle to Golden State,” Eurointelligence, February 25, 2009,

investors’ concerns that Greece will be unable to make all

available at www.eurointelligence.com/artile.581+M5accb03957e.

of the required payments on its debt. As a result, interest

0.html.

ECONOMIC AND BUDGET ISSUE BRIEF

FEDERAL DEBT AND THE RISK OF A FISCAL CRISIS 7

rates on 10-year Greek bonds have climbed to 8 percent- restructuring its debt (that is, seeking to modify the

age points above the rates on 10-year German bonds. contractual terms of existing obligations); pursuing

inflationary monetary policy (that is, increasing the

supply of money); and adopting an austerity program

How Might a Fiscal Crisis Affect the of spending cuts and tax increases.

United States?

In all three of those fiscal crises in other countries, sharp Restructuring Debt

increases in interest rates on government debt forced the Governments can attempt to change the terms of their

affected governments to make difficult choices. The U.S. existing debt—for example, by changing the payment

government would also face difficult choices if interest schedule—but that approach tends to be very costly for

rates on its debt spiked. For example, a 4-percentage- countries that try it.14 Any discussions or actions by

point across-the-board increase in interest rates would U.S. policymakers that raised the perceived likelihood of

raise federal interest payments next year by about that outcome would cause investors to demand higher

$100 billion relative to CBO’s baseline projection—a interest rates immediately, if they were willing to extend

jump of more than 40 percent. As longer-term debt additional credit at all.15 Furthermore, investors would

matured and was refinanced at such higher rates, the dif-

demand a large interest premium on subsequent loans

ference in the annual interest burden would mount; by

for many years.

2015, if such higher-than-anticipated rates persisted, net

interest would be nearly double the roughly $460 billion Inflationary Monetary Policy

that CBO currently projects for that year.11 Moreover, if An alternative approach is to increase the supply of

debt grew over time relative to GDP, the effect of a spike money in the economy. But as governments create money

in interest rates would become increasingly pronounced. to finance their activities or pay creditors during fiscal

crises, they raise inflation. Higher inflation has negative

A sudden increase in interest rates would also reduce the

consequences for the economy, especially if inflation

market value of outstanding government bonds, inflict-

moves above the moderate rates seen in most developed

ing losses on investors who hold them. That decline

countries in recent years.16 Higher inflation might appear

could precipitate a broader financial crisis by causing

to benefit the U.S. government financially because the

losses for mutual funds, pension funds, insurance compa-

value of the outstanding debt (which is mostly fixed in

nies, banks, and other holders of federal debt—losses that

dollar terms) would be lowered relative to the size of the

might be large enough to cause some financial institu-

economy (which would increase when measured in dollar

tions to fail.12 Foreign investors, who owned nearly half

terms).17 However, higher inflation would also increase

of U.S. debt held by the public in May 2010 (or about

the size of future budget deficits.

$4.0 trillion, $1.7 trillion of which was held by Japan and

China alone), would also face substantial losses.13

Specifically, if inflation was 1 percentage point higher

over the next decade than the rate CBO has projected,

If a fiscal crisis occurred in the United States, policy

budget deficits during those years would be roughly

options for responding to it would be limited and

unattractive. In particular, the government would need

to undertake some combination of three actions: 14. See Borensztein and Panizza, The Costs of Sovereign Default.

15. See Carmen M. Reinhart, Kenneth S. Rogoff, and Miguel A.

11. See Congressional Budget Office, An Analysis of the President’s Savastano, “Debt Intolerance,” Brookings Papers on Economic

Budgetary Proposals for Fiscal Year 2011 (March 2010). Activity, no. 1 (2003).

12. U.S. banks, insurance companies, and mutual funds held 16. For a discussion of the issues, see N. Gregory Mankiw,

approximately $1 trillion worth of U.S. debt as of the first quarter Macroeconomics, 5th ed. (New York: Worth Publishers, 2003),

of 2010. See Department of the Treasury, Financial Management pp. 95–107.

Service, “Ownership of Federal Securities,” Treasury Bulletin

17. Higher inflation would not enhance the U.S. government’s ability

(June 2010), Table OFS-2.

to redeem Treasury inflation-protected securities, which are

13. Department of the Treasury, Major Foreign Holders of Treasury indexed to inflation; however, such debt constitutes only about

Securities, May 2010, available at www.ustreas.gov/tic/mfh.txt. 7 percent of publicly held U.S. debt.

ECONOMIC AND BUDGET ISSUE BRIEF

CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE

8

$700 billion larger.18 Several factors contribute to that indicate that an immediate, permanent cut in spending

estimate. Investors, after having their investments or increase in revenues equal to about 1 percent of GDP

devalued by the rise in prices in the economy, would (relative to the policies assumed for the extended-baseline

demand higher interest rates in the future, even if infla- scenario) or about 5 percent of GDP (relative to the

tion was eventually reduced; thus, as debt matured, it policies assumed for the alternative fiscal scenario) would

would be refinanced at higher rates. Indeed, even raising prevent a net increase in the U.S. debt-to-GDP ratio over

the perceived likelihood of higher inflation during a fiscal the next 25 years. The latter would be equivalent to

crisis would trigger immediate further increases in inter- roughly 20 percent of all of the government’s noninterest

est rates. Moreover, the amounts of many government spending this year. Actions taken later, particularly if

benefits rise when prices rise, and much of the income tax there was a fiscal crisis, would need to be significantly

system is indexed to inflation. On balance, the increase in greater to achieve that same objective. Larger and more

tax revenues resulting from higher inflation would be abrupt changes in fiscal policy, such as substantial cuts in

more than offset by higher payments for benefit programs government benefit programs, would be more difficult

and higher interest payments as the outstanding debt for people to adjust to than smaller and more gradual

rolled over and ongoing deficits required the issuance changes.

of more debt.19

Increasing Taxes and Reducing Spending

21. See, for example, Alberto Alesina, “Fiscal Adjustments: Lessons

Austerity programs generally include both tax increases from Recent History” (paper presented at a meeting of Ecofin,

and spending reductions. When fiscal crises occur during Madrid, April 15, 2010); Alberto Alesina and Silvia Ardagna,

recessions, as they often do, such policy changes can Large Changes in Fiscal Policy: Taxes Versus Spending, Working

exacerbate the economic downturns—although some Paper No. 15438 (Cambridge, Mass.: National Bureau of

Economic Research, October 2009); Roberto Perotti, “Fiscal

studies suggest that certain types of fiscal austerity pro-

Policy in Good Times and Bad,” Quarterly Journal of Economics,

grams tend, at least in some circumstances, to stimulate

vol. 114, no. 4 (November 1999), pp. 1399–1436; and Alberto

economic growth.21 Alesina and Silvia Ardagna, “Tales of Fiscal Adjustment,”

Economic Policy, vol. 13, no. 27 (October 1998), pp. 487–545.

The later that actions are taken to address persistent

budget imbalances, the more severe they will have to be.

CBO’s long-term projections for the federal budget

This brief was prepared by Jonathan Huntley of CBO’s

Macroeconomic Analysis Division. It and other

18. See Congressional Budget Office, The Budget and Economic CBO publications are available at the agency’s Web site

Outlook: Fiscal Years 2010 to 2020, Appendix C. (www.cbo.gov).

19. Historically, the long-term effects of countries’ inflating away part

of their debt—very high borrowing costs and reduced economic

output—have been similar to the effects of explicit debt

Douglas W. Elmendorf

restructurings. See Reinhart, Rogoff, and Savastano, “Debt

Director

Intolerance.”


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